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The European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development: Legal and Policy Issuest 
John Linarelli* 
INTRODUCTION 
On May 29, 1990, in Paris, France, representatives of forty na-
tions, the European Community (EC) and the European Invest-
ment Bank signed the Agreement Establishing the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development. l The purpose of the Bank is 
to promote the development and reconstruction of the countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe.2 The Bank was conceived by Pre-
sident Francois Mitterrand of France and initially proposed by 
him in October 1989. Its establishment was agreed upon in only 
seven short months.3 The Agreement came into effect in March 
1991 and the Bank began operations in April 1991.4 It has its head-
t Copyright John Linarelli February 23, 1995. 
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I Agreement Establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, May 
29, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1077 (1990) [hereinafter Agreement]. The European Bank for Recon-
struction and Development shall hereinafter be referred to as the "EBRD" or the "Bank." 
2 As of April 1994, the Bank operates in the following countries: Albania, Armenia, Azer-
baijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, 
Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine 
and Uzbekistan. EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, FINANCING WITH 
THE EBRD 2 (1994) [hereinafter FINANCING WITH THE EBRD]. 
3 See Mark Easton & Kathryn Rorer, Recent Developments-The European Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development, 32 HARV. INT'L LJ. 527, 527 (1991); see also Steven Weber, Origins of 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 48 INT'L ORG. 1,9-31 (1994) (provid-
ing detailed history of the development of the Agreement establishing the Bank). 
4 Easton & Rorer, supra note 3, at 527; EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVEL-
OPMENT, 1991 ANNUAL REpORT 9 (1992) (,The idea of the Bank was first conceived in 
October 1989, before the Berlin Wall came down; it was inaugurated in April 1991 before the 
Moscow coup; and, in a matter of months, it has become fully operational. It has a staff of 
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quarters in London, although both of its presidents have been 
French.5 
The formation of the Bank has been hailed as remarkable. It has 
been described as "the first post cold war institution,"6 and the "first 
institution of the new world order."7 The majority of the Bank's 
shareholders are the states that comprise the European Union (EU), 
although the EC itself and the European Investment Bank are also 
shareholders.8 The United States is the largest single shareholder in 
the Bank, and played an influential role in crafting key provisions 
of the Articles of Agreement for the Bank.9 
The Bank is European in character, with an American influence. 1o 
It was formed at a time when there was an absence of one or a few 
dominant nation-states. As explained by one scholar of international 
relations: 
EBRD extends the scale and scope of cooperation among 
the Western powers to encompass a new geographic re-
gion. It is doing this during a period of rapid international 
change and in the absence of hegemonic concentration of 
power; and it is doing this according to a set of ideas and 
standards of legitimacy that derive principally from a net-
work of international institutions in Europe. ll 
The Bank is a unique multilateral development institution. Its 
charter is based on political conditionality, a concept forbidden to 
the World Bank.12 The very first article of the Articles of Agreement 
close to 400 from almost all of its member countries."). The Bank got off to a slow start, in 
that its loan activities initially were relatively low. The Bank attributed this to the restrictions 
in its Articles of Agreement and the lack of appropriate private sector projects in Central and 
Eastern Europe. See Andre Newburg, Eastern Europe and the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, 28 INT'L LAW. 433, 437 (1994); see infra notes 26-50 and accompanying text. 
5 Easton & Rorer, supra note 3, at 527. 
6Id. (quoting THE TIMES (London), Oct. 10, 1990, at 31, col. 1). 
7 PAUL A. MENKVELD, ORIGIN AND ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND 
DEVELOPMENT 96 (1991). 
8 See infra note 50 and accompanying text. 
9 See infra note 50 and accompanying text. 
10 See EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, Chairman's Report on the 
Agreement Establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, in BASIC Docu-
MENTS OF THE EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT 53, 55, art. 4 (1991) 
[hereinafter Explanatory Notes]. "The essential European character of the Bank lent itself to 
the denomination of its original authorized capital stock in the European Currency Unit, the 
ECU." Id. 
II Weber, supra note 3, at 2. 
12 The official name of the World Bank is the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development. The World Bank has several affiliates, the International Development Associa-
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of the Bank states that the purpose of the EBRD "shall be to foster 
the transition towards open market oriented economies and to pro-
mote private and entrepreneurial initiative in the Central and East-
ern European countries committed to and applying the principles 
of multiparty democracy, pluralism and market economics. "13 More-
over, the Preamble of the Agreement provides, in pertinent part, 
that the contracting parties are "[c]ommitted to the fundamental 
principles of multiparty democracy, the rule of law, respect for 
human rights and market economics" and welcome "the intent of 
the Central and Eastern European countries to further the practical 
implementation of multiparty democracy, strengthening democratic 
institutions, the rule of law and respect for human rights and their 
willingness to implement reforms in order to evolve towards market-
oriented economies."14 The overt political nature of the EBRD's 
mandate is a radical departure, a never-before-used approach in 
multilateral development financing institutions. 
The Bank's political mandate illustrates its post Cold War charac-
ter. More fundamentally, the Bank can be viewed as a significant 
foreign policy tool of its powerful Western shareholders.1s An insti-
tution with such a political mandate, operating in critical and sen-
sitive regions in Central and Eastern Europe, necessarily implicates 
foreign policy considerations. This is true for the EU and its Member 
States, which share geographical proximity to the countries of Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe, as well as for the United States, the last 
remaining superpower. 16 
tion, the International Finance Corporation and the Multilateral InvesUnent Guarantee 
Agency. The World Bank will be hereinafter referred to as either the 'World Bank" or the 
"IBRD." The Articles of Agreement for the World Bank provide that "[t]he Bank shall not 
interfere in the political affairs of any member." Articles of Agreement of the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Dec. 27, 1945, art. II, 2 U.N.T.S. 134, quoted in 
Jonathan Cahn, Challenging the New Imperial Authority: The World Bank and the Democratiza-
tion of Development, 6 HARV. HUM. RTs.J. 159, 163 (1993). 
13 Agreement, supra note 1, art. 1. 
14 Agreement, supra note 1, pmbl. 
15 Dr. Edward A. Hewitt, of the Brookings Institution, has testified before the U.S. Congress 
that the EBRD "is a good investment in democracy and in our national security, probably a 
far better invesUnent than yet another weapons system or more spending on existing weapons 
systems." European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
International Economic Policy, Trade, Oceans and Environment of the Senate Comm. on Foreign 
Relations, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 26-27 (1990) (statement of Dr. Edward A. Hewett, Senior 
Fellow, Brookings Institution). 
16 Professor Eric Stein explains the role of democracy in foreign relations as follows: 
United States Secretary of State George Marshall told the General Assembly of the 
United Nations in 1948 that "[g]overnments which systematically disregarded the 
rights of their own people were not likely to respect the rights of other nations and 
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From a financial or commercial perspective, the EBRD is neces-
sary to deal with critical capital shortfalls that Central and Eastern 
European countries have experienced during their transition from 
socialism. Without capital, the embryonic private sectors of these 
countries would die an early death. Commercial banks, however, 
have been leery about investing substantial sums in Central and 
Eastern Europe because of their adverse experiences with sovereign 
risk in the Latin American debt crisis,l7 Commercial bank lending 
will relate substantially to the activities of the significant corpo-
rate clients of such banks. IS Also, the confidence of commercial 
banks in the creditworthiness of the Central and Eastern European 
governments and their privatizing or newly privatized enterprises is 
a prerequisite to purely commercial lending by purely commercial 
banks. 19 Such confidence depends heavily on legal and economic 
reform in the countries in question. 20 The EBRD in part was created 
to alleviate these problems. 
The Bank is an apparent product of current thinking in devel-
opment economics, with its focus on small and medium enter-
prises, private enterprise development and the entrepreneur as the 
engine of development. 21 Statist approaches to development do not 
accord with current dogma in development economics. These phi-
losophies are by no means limited to the promotion of economic 
other people, and were likely to seek their objectives by coercion and force in the 
international field. 
History confirms that it is the democratically governed states that by definition are 
likely to respect basic rights of their people-and there is impressive empirical 
evidence that, " [w]ith only the most marginal exceptions, democratic states have not 
fought each other in the modern era"; hence a democratic world would be "a more 
peaceful world." 
Eric Stein, International Law in Internal Law: Toward Internationalization of Central-Eastern 
European Constitutions?, 88 AM.]. INT'L L. 427, 427 (1994). 
17 See Eduardo Lachica, Banks Unlikely to be Big Lenders to Eastern Europe, WALL ST.]., Apr. 
17,1990, at B7; Michael Sesit, Banks Reluctant to Bail Out East Bloc: Unsure Political Conditions, 
Damaged Economies Make Lenders Cautious, WALL ST.]., June 27, 1990, at A9. 
18 Proposed U.S. Participation in the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD), and Update on Exchange Rate Report, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International 
Development, Finance, Trade and Monetary Policy of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and 
Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1990) (statement of Horst Schulman, Managing 
Director, Institute of International Finance) [hereinafter Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
International Development]. 
19Id. 
20Id. 
21 See James H. Weaver & Kevin M. O'Keefe, Whither Development Economics?, 1991 SAIS 
REv. 113. See generally HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN 
THE THIRD WORLD (1989). 
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wealth, as the entrepreneur can be viewed as the engine of demo-
cratic pluralism.22 
The Bank has been very busy in its few years of existence. Since 
its founding in April 1991, the Bank has created a portfolio of 159 
projects as of its quarterly financial statements of September 30, 
1994, with a total value of ECU 3.6 billion.23 The Bank is operating 
at a loss, but not at amounts that would be considered excessive or 
out of control for a development bank.24 The Bank's projects include 
loans, project financing and increasing levels of equity investments 
in private enterprises.25 
This Article attempts a comprehensive analysis of the EBRD's 
formation and activities. Section I examines the origins of the EBRD. 
Section II examines two significant policies which are collateral to 
the Bank's financing activities: the requirement that the Bank con-
sider environmental issues in its activities, and the political condi-
tionality of the Bank. Section III provides a detailed analysis of the 
EBRD's policies that directly relate to financing. Section IV exam-
ines the role of the Bank in the context of the EU and trade 
liberalization between members of the Union and the countries of 
Central and East Europe. Section V concludes the Article byexplain-
ing that the Bank may present a positive model for sustainable 
development. 
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE EBRD 
President Francois Mitterrand first declared the idea of the EBRD 
in a speech before the European Parliament on October 25, 1989.26 
The general notion of a multilateral development institution for 
Central and Eastern Europe, however, was first conceived by Jacques 
22 As stated by Professor Weber, "[s]mall businesses were important to EBRD not only 
because this sector promised to generate quick payoffs in economic activity but also because 
the attention to SMEs meshed comfortably with the new Bank's special commitment to 
democracy." Weber, supra note 3, at 24. Professor Weber continues in the footnote: "That is, 
the development of new small businesses under the direction of private citizen entrepreneurs 
was thought to reinforce in Europe the political foundations of democracy, even as the 
economies of these countries as a whole suffered the aggregate traumas of transition." Id. at 
24 n.70. 
23 EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, QUARTERLY FINANCIAL RE-
PORT 2 (Sept. 1994). 
24 See id. 
25Id. 
26 MENKVELD, supra note 7, at 25. At the time, Mitterrand was President of the European 
Council of Heads of State and Government. Id. 
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Attali in 1989, when he was a close advisor to President Mitterrand.27 
Eventually, Attali became the first president of the EBRD. At the 
time of President Mitterrand's declaration, the concrete nature and 
characteristics of the EBRD had not yet been established. These 
characteristics subsequently had to be negotiated by the countries 
that later would found the Bank. 
The details of what this new institution was to become can be 
viewed from polar extremes. The resulting structure and functions 
of the EBRD were a compromise of competing European, American 
and to some extent Japanese interests. Initially, the French touted a 
"maximalist conception" for the Bank.28 As explained by Professor 
Steven Weber, the French 
... saw the Bank as absorbing all existing multilateral aid 
programs aimed at [Central and Eastern Europe], includ-
ing the EC Poland/Hungary, Aid for Restructuring Econo-
mies (PHARE) program and the Polish Currency Stabiliza-
tion Fund. In addition, it would supplant the emerging 
interests of the World Bank and the IMF. Thus its role 
would be far greater than the typical role of a regional 
development bank. Attali's proposal also envisioned a re-
stricted membership or at least a severely restricted role for 
non-European states. "European," as defined by the French 
at this time, did not include the United States as a principal 
member.29 
The opposite extreme to the French maximalist conception was 
the "no aid", free market conception, proffered by certain American 
nongovernmental institutions, notably scholars associated with the 
Cato Institute and the Heritage Foundation. Their arguments against 
any form of aid include, inter alia, that multilateral development 
27 Attali's relationship with President Mitterrand has been described as follows: 
"Attali is famous as an ideas man. 'Bubbling' is the word usually used to describe his 
production of ideas .... 'He is extraordinarily imaginative and creative' claims a 
colleague .... Francois Mitterrand has often testified that his intellectual fecundity 
is one of Attali's most valuable traits as an advisor, even if the ideas require consid-
erable sifting. 'Mter all,' Mitterrand told one interviewer, 'it's enough if Attali gives 
me one good idea among the 10 he presents to me: that's already quite formidable.' 
... Attali says he first thought of the project in August 1989. He said 'it was an 
obvious idea, an obvious need.''' 
[d. (quoting Darell Delamaide, Friends in High Places, EUROMONEY,june 1990, at 24-30). 
28 Weber, supra note 3, at 14. 
29 [d. 
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institutions, such as the World Bank, the regional development 
banks, and the newest regional bank, the EBRD, cause aid depend-
ency, contribute little to real reform, have been unsuccessful in 
alleviating poverty and promoting development, misallocate resources 
on the basis of bureaucratic planning rather than free market prin-
ciples, and promote and maintain statist governments that fail to 
enhance the welfare of their citizens.3o 
Moreover, these scholars argue that the EBRD and other aid 
institutions distract attention from serious problems of lack of mar-
ket access, in the EU and elsewhere, for the products of the Central 
and Eastern European economiesY Dr. Edward Hudgins of the 
Heritage Foundation is of the view that the EBRD "could insure the 
Latin Americanization of Eastern Europe," and could cause a debt 
crisis in the region similar to the crisis that befell the Latin American 
countries.32 Melanie S. Tammen, a Cato Institute scholar, summa-
nzes: 
The World Bank's record throughout the developing world 
and in Eastern Europe overwhelmingly disqualifies it as a 
catalyst for radical change in the region. Similarly, the new 
EBRD is fundamentally a rearguard socialist undertaking. 
The last thing nations in transition need is multilateral 
development bank loans to politicize their economies.33 
These scholars present an essentially American view of the world, 
based in classical economic theory and minimalist views of the role 
of government in society. One could contrast these views with a 
30 For a collection of writings by Cato Institute scholars, see PERPETUATING POVERTY; THE 
WORLD BANK, THE IMF AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD (Doug Bandow & Ian Vasquez eds., 
1994) [hereinafter PERPETUATING POVERTY]. In particular, see Melanie S. Tammen, Fostering 
Aid Addiction in Eastern Europe, in PERPETUATING POVERTY, supra, at 101-23; see also Dr. 
Edward L. Hudgins, Ten Objections to an East European Development Bank, Heritage Founda-
tion Reports, May 9,1990, available in LEXIS, Exec Library, Hfrpts File [hereinafter Hudgins, 
Ten Objections]; Dr. Edward L. Hudgins, The Eastern Europe Development Bank: Turning the 
East Bloc into Latin America, Backgrounder Update, Apr. 4, 1990, available in LEXIS, Exec 
Library, Hfrpts File [hereinafter Hudgins, Turning the East Bloc]; Hearing Before the House 
Subcomm. on International Development, supra note 18, at 28 (statement of Dr. Edward L. 
Hudgins, Director, the Center for International Economic Growth, Heritage Foundation). 
31 Tammen, supra note 30, at 122-23; Hudgins, Ten Objections, supra note 30 ("[T]he 
Eastern Europeans themselves are not clamoring for such aid. Rather, they are asking for 
markets opened to their exports and direct foreign investment by Western businesses in their 
countries. These free market tendencies should be encouraged with open markets in the West, 
not with international welfare."). 
32 Hudgins, Ten Objections, supra note 30. 
33Tammen, supra note 30, at 122. 
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traditionally continental European view, which some may argue re-
lies on relatively statist conceptions of the role of government. As 
explained by one European official, in the deliberations concerning 
the EBRD's structure: "As Europeans, we view American attitudes 
towards the public sector as dogmatic. They perceive it as necessarily 
negative. We agree on promoting private enterprise, but we'd like 
less rigidity. Their attitudes show a lack of trust in the board of 
administration. "34 The EBRD thus could be examined from the 
point of view of competing roles of government in the Western 
tradition. 
The initial view of the Bank by the U.S. Government was to some 
degree in accordance with that of the above American scholars. As 
summarized by one scholar: 
Top Treasury Department officials, wary of the poor track 
record other regional development banks have had in try-
ing to support private-sector development, argued on tech-
nical grounds that EBRD was at best unnecessary, since left 
to its own devices the "market"-meaning private inves-
tors-would more efficiently allocate capital for the needs 
of [Central and Eastern Europe] .35 
At the time, however, the United States decided to involve itself in 
such a large project so early in the post Cold War period because of 
pragmatic political considerations.36 The United States thus has not 
adopted a strict "no aid" approach. Nevertheless, the United States 
is skeptical of creating new institutions without at least considering 
the efficacy of existing ones, and considering whether the World 
Bank could perform the functions of a new bureaucracyY 
The EU endorsed a "minimalist conception," somewhere between 
the free market approach of American libertarian scholars and the 
maximalist conception propounded by the French Government.38 
This minimalist conception did not question the need or utility of 
a multilateral development institution. The approach of the EC was 
to have the EBRD "act in concert with, rather than try to subsume, 
other aid initiatives in [Central and Eastern Europe]. "39 The EC 
wanted to preserve the "Europeanness" of the institution yet still 
34 Pierre Townsend, Europeans Worry EBRD has been Co-opted try U.S., ANN. MEETINGS NEWS, 
Sept. 23, 1990, at 35, quoted in MENKVELD, supra note 7, at 62. 
35 Weber, supra note 3, at 16. 
36 [d. 
37 [d. 
38 [d. at IS. 
39 [d. 
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allow other countries, notably the United States and the Soviet 
Union, to become members of the Bank.40 
The politics of the period were inextricably tied to competing 
views of the putative role of the EBRD. Political considerations 
outweighed any theoretical economic issues concerning the EBRD's 
role. At the time, Germany had been able to provide significant 
bilateral aid and private investment to its neighboring states in 
Central and Eastern EuropeY In contrast, France, lacking the re-
sources of Germany, viewed the Bank as a way to leverage its power 
in regions to be served by the Bank.42 
The United States had significant economic and political interests 
in these regions.43 In fact, successful reform would serve as a coun-
terweight to the then Soviet Union.44 American involvement in the 
region was designed to push the EU to become less protective and 
insular and more of an international actor.45 Leadership of the EU 
in the EBRD could serve to facilitate a more broadly focused Union 
with less protected markets.46 
Ultimately, the Bank emerged from a synthesis of philosophies 
and power bases. The main characteristics of the Bank, as negotiated 
by the initial members, are as follows: 
1) Political conditionality. The Bank is the first multilateral devel-
opment institution to have as its express purpose the fostering of 
multiparty democracy, pluralism, market-oriented economics, rule 
of law and human rights;47 
2) Environmental protection. The Bank is required by its Articles of 
Agreement to promote and take into account environmental con-
cerns and the concept of sustainable development in an environ-
mental context;48 
3) Emphasis on the private sector. Mter hard bargaining in the short 
period in which the Bank's Articles of Agreement were prepared, 
the American view that the Bank should focus on private sector 
development prevailed. The Bank is required to invest at least sixty 
percent of its funds in the private sector and in privatization. The 
4oWeber, supra note 3, at 15. 
41Id. at 8. 
42Id. at 9. 
43Id. at 10. 
44Id. 
45Weber, supra note 3, at 10. 
46Id. 
47 See infra notes 65-112 and accompanying text. 
48 See infra notes 52-64 and accompanying text. 
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Bank combines the concept of a merchant or investment bank with 
that of a development bank;49 and 
4) European majority. Although the United States is the single 
largest shareholder and exerted some influence in the creation of 
the Bank, the Bank is essentially a European institution. The major-
ity of the Bank's shares are held by the members of the EU. Its client 
states in Central and Eastern Europe also are members. The EU 
itself, and also the European Investment Bank, are shareholders.50 
II. COLLATERAL POLICIES IN EBRD GOVERNANCE 
The Articles of Agreement of the EBRD suggest a two-part frame-
work for analysis of EBRD policies. First, there are collateral policies 
that the Bank must adhere to-policies that do not relate directly 
to the commercial or financial aspects of a Bank project. These 
collateral policies are the requirement of political conditionality in 
Bank operations and the environmental protection mandate of the 
Bank. Second, there are direct policies that the Bank applies in its 
day-to-day financing operations-policies that relate directly to the 
soundness of investments and loans. This section examines collat-
eral policies. 51 
A. Environmental Protection-Sustainable Development 
The EBRD's Articles of Agreement expressly require the EBRD to 
take measures "to promote in the full range of its activities environ-
mentally sound and sustainable development."52 This is the first 
instance in which the charter of a development institution formally 
requires that the institution take environmental issues into account 
in its activities.53 One authoritative text describes this provision as 
containing "modern language,"54 which is interpreted to mean that 
49 See infra notes 113-17 and accompanying text. 
50 See Initial Subscriptions to the Authorized Capital Stock for Prospective Members Which May 
Become Members in Accordance with Article 6.1, reprinted in IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, THE EURO-
PEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE 
CONSTITUENT AGREEMENT app. at 2 (1990) [hereinafter SHIHATA, A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS]. 
51 For a discussion on the dichotomy between direct and collateral policies, see JOHN 
CIBINIC,jR. & RALPH C. NASH,jR., FORMATION OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS 942 (1986). 
52 Agreement, supra note 1, art. 2(1) (vii). 
53 Chris A. Wold & Durwood Zaelke, Promoting Sustainable Development and Democracy in 
Central and Eastern Europe: The Rnle of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
7 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'y 559, 566 (1992) [hereinafter Wold & Zaelke, Promoting Sustainable 
Development]. 
54 SHIHATA, A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 50, at 48. 
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the provision reflects what now is considered good policy for multi-
lateral development institutions. The Explanatory Notes to the Ar-
ticles of Agreement provide, in pertinent part, the following envi-
ronmental mandate: 
Delegates recognized the serious environmental problems 
in Central and Eastern Europe, and emphasized that prin-
ciples of environmentally sound development must be in-
tegrated into the full range of the Bank's operations. Thus, 
Delegates intended "in the full range of its activities" to 
include all of the Bank's activities, including technical as-
sistance and all special operations, and not merely that the 
Bank should be able to provide support directly for specific 
environmen tal projects.55 
Legal scholarship appears to have addressed the environmental 
issues relating to the Bank more than any other subject.56 The per-
tinent literature has either been critical or has recommended vari-
ous methods of implementation of the Bank's environmental man-
date. Recommendations center on the idea of creating bureaucratic 
review structures in or by the Bank. 
The borrowing countries are struggling with establishing democ-
racies; they are in transition.57 One sign or function of working 
democracy is participatory pluralism-the involvement of people 
and groups in political decisionmaking, and not merely at the voting 
polls.58 Therefore, institutions designed to involve public participa-
55 Explanatory Notes, supra note 10, at 168-69. 
56 See generally, e.g., Panel, Present at the Creation: A New Development Bank for Europe in the 
Age of Environmental Awareness, 84 AM. SOC'y INT'L L. PROC. 77 (1990) [hereinafter Present 
at the Creation]; Wold & Zaelke, Promoting Sustainable Development, supra note 53; Stephanie 
C. Guyett, Environment and Lending: Lessons of the World Bank, Hope for the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 889 (1992); Chris Wold & 
Durwood Zaelke, Establishing an Independent Review Board at the European Bank for Recon-
struction and Development: A Model for Improving MDB Decisionmaking, 2 DUKE ENVTL. L. & 
POL'y F. 59 (1992). This Article, therefore, will not address these issues in depth. 
57 See generally EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, TRANSITION 
REpORT (Oct. 1994). 
58 See generally Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 46 (1992); George A. Zaphiriou, Use of Comparative Law fry the Legislator, 30 AM. J. 
COMPo L. 71 (1982). As explained by Professor Zaphiriou in the context of the United States: 
As a result of participatory pluralism in the United States, American law reform is 
achieved by the balancing of opposing interests in the light of proximate, reliable 
and readily accessible experimentation within diverse, though basically compatible, 
social environments. The American legal establishment, under the influence of a 
strong tradition of sociological jurisprudence represented by Holmes, Pound, Frank, 
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tion should primarily be at the country or community level, rather 
than at the Bank level. 
Moreover, the proposals are not practical without the precondi-
tion of sufficient legal infrastructure in the countries in question.59 
At this time, however, the necessary legal infrastructure is, in all 
probability, inadequate in many countries served by the Bank. In 
addition, one must be wary of any attempted transplantations oflaws 
and bureaucratic structures from one country to another that do 
not account for country-specific idiosyncrasies.60 Approaches that 
too closely resemble the U.S. National Environmental Policy Act61 
and other U.S. laws dealing with environmental assessment may not 
be readily transplantable to Central and Eastern Europe without 
adaptation. These types of laws are difficult to administer even in 
the West; the practicality of their proper administration in the East 
should be considered.62 
the radical Llewellyn of the 60's, is well aware that 'The first requirement of a sound 
body of law is that it should correspond with the actual feelings and demands of the 
community." 
Zaphiriou, supra at 93 (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 38 (M. Howe 
ed.,1963)). 
59 See Present at the Creation, supra note 56, at 86 (arguing for development of market 
infrastructure as a priority). 
60 See Honorable Roberto G. MacLean, Judicial Reasoning and Social Reality in Peru, 28 AM. 
J. COMPo L. 489, 490 (1980). Central and Eastern Europe should avoid what has happened in 
Latin America. As described in the context of Peru: 
In Peru, legislation often is drafted without the necessary studies and information. 
The national reality has just begun to be explored and, faced with a lack of facts and 
figures and ignorant of precise situations to be regulated in many cases, legislation 
is done "by ear," frequently working from the legislative models available from other 
countries. Recourse to comparative law as an aid to the legislator, if made injudi-
ciously, carries with it the danger of causing a serious distortion of the juridical 
function. Laws are a reflection of the conflicting interests existing in a society and 
its duty is to neutralize them and put them in equilibrium. For this reason, when a 
law is transplanted from one country to another, it may be that in the new country 
the law does not satisfactorily resolve the conflicts between interests, simply because 
the conflicts are distinct. In such cases they remain at least partially up in the air 
and without resolution. It then falls to the judge, if he is not content with formal 
solutions, to face the contradiction between law and reality; between a foregone 
conclusion contained in the model and the real conduct of people. 
Id. at 490. 
61 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 4321-4370d (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). 
62 This is not to say that substantive environmental standards should not be harmonized. It 
is axiomatic that nature and its degradation by man know no political boundaries. Rather, the 
procedures by which substantive environmental standards are enforced may vary in countries, 
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The EBRD's borrowing countries should be concerned with any 
undue allocation of responsibilities to them to pay for the massive 
investments needed for environmental remediation and protection. 
Admittedly, the State, in these countries, caused significant environ-
mental damage. Nevertheless, any aid programs should approach 
this problem as a European problem and not merely as national 
problems of single countries. The problem involves externalities; the 
Western Europeans will benefit greatly from cleanup in Central and 
Eastern Europe.53 Moreover, this would seem to be an area in which 
commercial loans, in accordance with sound banking principles, 
may not always be the best financing approach. However, maximiz-
ing ways to employ this approach would be beneficial nonetheless.64 
B. Post Cold War Orthodoxy in the EBRD's Articles of Agreement 
The EBRD's Articles of Agreement set forth a strong set of provi-
sions that condition the Bank's operations on political considera-
tions. The Preamble to the Articles presents important underpin-
particularly as between the United States and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 
In public law, one finds great variations among national legal systems. 
63 As explained by the economist Jan Vanous: 
I am particularly disturbed by the suggestion that the Bank should go into environ-
mental lending. This is a cop-out. Any economist will tell you that if you want to 
invest in the environment there are lots of externalities. If I was an East European 
I would say fine, lend me money, and I will clean up the environment, but the benefit 
is not only for me but also for the neighbors. To demonstrate the illogic of the 
situation, why would West Germany spend extra deutsche marks on something that 
cleans up the West German environment that is costly on a marginal basis, while if 
it only spent the same money fifty kilometers eastward across the border the benefit 
would be five-fold, and most of it would be felt in West Germany as well? There is a 
very strong argument for subsidization of the process. I think if the West wants the 
environment to be cleaned up because it would significantly benefit from it, it ought 
to subsidize it. The Germans understood this a long time ago and particularly when 
it came to dealing with the GDR. They figured out that if you want a clean Elbe 
River, you should pay the East Germans and help them to build cleanup facilities, 
so that downstream we do not end up with dirty water. Environmental cleanup and 
things like that are very costly and, in my opinion, ought to be subsidized. 
It is really the responsibility of the Europeans to get their act together and start 
thinking like Europeans. If you want to clean up Europe you have got to think 
globally now. You have got to be allocating the resources rationally because the air 
moves all around, you cannot contain it. If you clean up in your own country it is 
not going to help if your neighbor is still polluting. Your neighbor may not be able 
to afford the expensive pollution equipment. Even if you give them loans they will 
not be able to do it. 
Present at the Creation, supra note 56, at 87. 
64 See infra notes 113-67 and accompanying text on the Bank's lending policies. 
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nings for the Bank's existence, including a commitment of the 
contracting parties "to the fundamental principles of multiparty 
democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and market 
economics."65 The Preamble refers to the Final Act of the Helsinki 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and its Decla-
ration of Principles,66 which has set forth significant principles in 
providing for an emerging right of democratic self governance.67 
Finally, the Preamble welcomes "the intent of Central and Eastern 
European countries to further the practical implementation of mul-
tiparty democracy, strengthening democratic institutions, the rule 
of law and respect for human rights and their willingness to imple-
ment reforms in order to evolve towards market-oriented econo-
mies."68 
Article 1 of the Bank's Article's of Agreement presents the Bank's 
purpose as follows: 
In contributing to economic progress and reconstruction, 
the purpose of the Bank shall be to foster the transition 
towards open market oriented economies and to promote 
private and entrepreneurial initiative in the Central and 
Eastern European countries committed to and applying 
the principles of multiparty democracy, pluralism and mar-
ket economics.69 
Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of the Bank's Articles of Agreement pro-
vides that "[t]he resources and facilities of the Bank shall be used 
exclusively to implement the purpose and carry out the functions 
set forth, respectively, in Articles 1 and 2 of this Agreement. "70 
Paragraph 2 of Article 8 provides that "[t]he Bank may conduct its 
operations in countries from Central and Eastern Europe which are 
proceeding steadily in the transition towards market-oriented econo-
mies and the promotion of private and entrepreneurial initiative, 
and which apply, by concrete steps and otherwise, the principles as 
set forth in Article 1 of this Agreement. "71 The Board of Directors 
65 Agreement, supra note 1, pmb!' 
66 Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, reprinted in ARIE BLODE, 
FROM HELSINKI TO VIENNA, BASIC DOCUMENTS OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS 43 (1990) [herein-
after Final Act]. 
67 Franck, supra note 58, at 66-68. 
68 Agreement, supra note 1, pmb!. 
69 [d. art. 1. 
70 [d. art. 8(1). 
71 [d. art. 8 (2). 
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of the Bank is to review, at least annually, the Bank's operations "to 
ensure that the purpose of Bank, including by implication the po-
litical aspects of its mandate, is fully served."72 
The Bank's political mandate is the result of United States and 
Japanese insistence during the negotiations of the Articles of Agree-
ment. 73 There was no consensus among EC states on this issue.74 
France and several other states were opposed to political condition-
ality.75 The European divisiveness is puzzling, given the sweeping 
pronouncements of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe on entitlements to democratic governance in Europe.76 
The U.S. position could be viewed, at first blush, as ideological or 
idealistic.77 It does, however, have a pragmatic base in ensuring that 
the Bank does not promote the continued existence of statist re-
gimes and command economies, or reverse the gains made in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe towards democracy.78 The American view is 
that if the Bank is to play a role, it must play a positive role in 
72 EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE 
MANDATE OF THE EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT 2 [hereinafter 
POLITICAL ASPECTS]. The relevant provision in the Articles of Agreement is Article 11 (2) (i). 
73 MENKVELD, supra note 7, at 53. 
74Id. 
75Id. 
76 See Franck, supra note 58, at 66--69. 
77 Present at the Creation, supra note 56, at 79 ("The most significant problem is the rigidity, 
reflecting ideological positions, proposed to be written into the charter, which presents serious 
dangers for a new institution. In my view this problem ... has been needlessly created by the 
United States."). 
78Id. at 82-83. Howard Hills, former Vice President and General Counsel for the Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation, has explained as follows: 
Id. 
I do not think it is ideological ... for the United States to take the position that this 
bank should function in a way that does not reinforce the parastatal regime in these 
command economies. It is not ideological for the United States to insist that priva-
tization be a priority for the EBRD. The United States wants to ensure that the Bank 
functions in a way that actually promotes the development of market economies. 
The reason I reject labeling the U.S. position as ideological is that I believe the U.S. 
Government's policy is consistent with the democratic aspirations of the peoples 
concerned. The Bank should respond to grass-roots movements of the people in 
those countries, and unless I am reading the situation wrong, I think what they are 
asking for is democratic government and a market economy not dominated by the 
economic elite that became entrenched in the Communist era .... 
Lech Walesa and the Solidarity union did not put themselves at risk and did not 
bring about one of the most radical political and social transformations of this 
century in order to have a multilateral development bank or any other investment 
promotion program come in and reinforce the command economy and parastatal 
regime that existed under the Communist government. 
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progressing the borrowing countries toward some form of coherent, 
market oriented democratic framework. Of course, this is the pre-
ferred American approach to development aid.79 Presumably, under-
lying all of this is the principle that democracies tend not to go to 
war with one another. 
Reversal of the gains made in recent years could lead to an even 
more unstable world in which authoritarian governments, with no 
incentives to adhere to liberal democratic principles, vie for power.so 
Ideology and pragmatism are not easily segregable concepts in the 
post Cold War world, at least in the American view of that world. 
From a European point of view, the convergence of economics and 
politics cannot be avoided, and indeed is the basis of the EU.S! 
The differing views between the Americans and the Europeans on 
such policies have an arguable basis in historical views of the proper 
roles of foreign policy.s2 Although the Western countries may differ 
in foreign policy approaches, the EBRD appears to be a significant 
foreign policy tool, particularly when its political conditionality is 
considered. The American view of the Bank is that it is a "foreign 
policy-oriented European initiative that would 'demonstrate the po-
litical commitment of Western Europe to and solidarity with the 
[Central and Eastern European] countries and at the same time 
include the United States in a key supportive role."'s3 Since trade 
agreements often have their roots in foreign policy, there is no 
reason why a multilateral development institution would not have 
similar roots.S4 The EBRD allows the United States and other coun-
tries to leverage principles as well as aid funds. s5 
79 See Weber, supra note 3, at 21. 
80 Stein, supra note 16, at 427. 
81 See Weber, supra note 3, at 23. 
82 See HENRY KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY 17-55 (1994). 
83Weber, supra note 3, at 2l. 
84 See The North American Free Trade Agreement: Environment and Labor Agreements: Joint 
Hearing Before the Subcomms. on Economic Policy, Trade and Environment and Western Hemi-
sphere Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 15, 21 (1993) 
(statements of Reps. James Kolbe & William Richardson); see generally Paul Krugman, The 
NAFTA Debate: The Uncomfortable Truth About NAFTA: It's Foreign Policy, Stupid, 72 FOREIGN 
AFF. 13 (Nov./Dec. 1993). 
85 Rep. James A. Leach, A Republican Looks at Foreign Policy, 71 FOREIGN AFF. 22 (Summer 
1992) ("[IJn addition to leveraging dollars, these institutions allow the West to leverage 
principles. Few governments are prone to bow to pressure for market-oriented reform coming 
from a single country. Many, however, will institute politically difficult reforms as prerequisites 
for IMF and World Bank support."). 
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The Bank has published criteria on its political mandate.86 These 
criteria make it evident that, as to political conditionality, although 
the Europeans lost the war, they won the peace. European standards 
and norms are applied by the Bank in its political assessments and 
activi ties. 87 
The founding countries of the Bank provided no meaningful 
details on how the Bank is supposed to apply the political criteria 
set forth in its charter.88 'While the details were not filled in," how-
ever, "it was clear that consensus about EBRD's political mandate 
went beyond the World Bank's notion of 'good governance' toward 
a more elaborate set of political attributes related closely to the EC's 
standards."89 The Bank looks to such European institutions and 
documents as the Council of Europe, the European Convention on 
Human Rights,90 the Declaration on Principles of the Final Act of 
the Helsinki Agreement,91 the Document of the Copenhagen Meet-
ing on the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE,92 the 
CSCE Charter of Paris for a New Europe93 and the European Com-
mission on Human Rights.94 
Commentators have expressed concern that "strong socialist tra-
ditions" in Western Europe could make the operation of the political 
mandate of the Bank suspect.95 These criticisms, however, do not 
focus on the larger issues. The need is for the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe to formulate and apply their own version of 
multiparty democracy and market economics, without too much 
86 See generally POLITICAL AsPECTS, supra note 72; EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION 
AND DEVELOPMENT, POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE MANDATE OF THE EUROPEAN BANK IN RELA-
TION TO ETHNIC MINORITIES (1993) [hereinafter ETHNIC MINORITIES]. 
87 Philippe Sands, External Relations, 40 INT'L & COMPo L.Q. 730, 733 (1991); EBRD: Increase 
in Bank's Capital Foreseen, European Report, Apr. 4, 1992, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, 
Eurrpt File. 
88 See Weber, supra note 3, at 17. 
89Id. at 19; see also Easton & Rorer, supra note 3, at 528. For a critical review of World Bank 
policies, see Cahn, supra note 12. 
90 SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, DIRECTOR OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, 1 EURO-
PEAN CONVENTIONS AND AGREEMENTS 21 (1971). See generally LUKE CLEMENTS, EUROPEAN 
HUMAN RIGHTS: TAKING A CASE UNDER THE CONVENTION (1994). 
91 Final Act, supra note 66. 
92 Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, 
June 29, 1990,29 I.L.M. 1305 (1990). 
93 Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Nov. 21, 1990,30 I.L.M. 190 (1990). 
94 POLITICAL ASPECTS, supra note 72, at 3; ETHNIC MINORITIES, supra note 86, at 3, 6-11. 
95 Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Development, supra note 18 (statement of Dr. 
Hudgins); see Present at the Creation, supra note 56, at 94 ("Strong socialist traditions" such as 
that of Austria "is not a model we want to see."). 
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emphasis on the pedigree of the institutions, so long as what they 
create can honestly be said to fall within established paradigms. To 
some, there is no such thing as a completely free market or a wholly 
privatized state, nor do markets somehow inexorably arise from 
nature.96 The countries in question will probably never resemble the 
United States in their approach to the issues; they have different 
legal and national cultures. These countries should emulate the 
standards of the EU, since it is in their national interests to someday 
join the Union. Of course, one would hope that these countries, and 
the Bank, will learn from the mistakes of past statist approaches of 
the nations of Western Europe and of other regions. 
Commentators have suggested that potential unfavorable deci-
sions by the EBRD based on political criteria could expose the EBRD 
to charges of interference in domestic affairs or infringement of 
sovereignty.97 For example, what if the government of a borrowing 
country undertakes an approach based on the Chinese model of 
economic development, in which economic reform and political 
repression are combined?98 An even more difficult question is how 
the Bank would deal with some of the more subtle forms of authori-
tarianism that seem to be on the rise in the world.99 In addition, how 
should the Bank deal with the issue where there is no loan default 
from a commercial point of view, and declaration of default would 
not be sound banking practice? These are sovereign risks that the 
Bank inevitably will have to address because of its political mandate. 
In this author's view, the Bank has sufficient discretion to take 
appropriate action, and arguments of interference or intervention 
fail to withstand serious scrutiny. As a threshold matter, the borrow-
ing countries are shareholders in the Bank. The Bank lends to 
96 See Warren J. Samuels, The Legal-Economic Nexus, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1556, 1568 
(1989). See generally Paul H. Britzke, Designing the Legal Frameworks for Markets in Central and 
Eastern Europe, 7 TRANSNAT'L L. 35 (1994). 
97 Easton & Rorer, supra note 3, at 535. 
98 As explained in Weaver & O'Keefe, supra note 21, at 126: 
Id. 
Efforts to reform Soviet-style economies have been particularly difficult. If the Soviet 
Union represents one extreme-political reform first, followed by failed economic 
reform-China represents the other extreme-economic reform without subsequent 
political reform. As of 1991, it seems that the Chinese have been more successful: 
Their economic reform is proceeding, without interruption, in spite of the govern-
ment's having destroyed the country's democratic forces. 
99 See Panel, Immigration and Sovereignty: National Responses to Bad Aliens, 88 AM. SOc'y 
INT'L L. PROC. 463 (1995). 
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members. These members fully and freely consent to the Bank's 
Articles of Agreement. They have given up part of their sovereignty 
in the execution of the Articles of Agreement, which is a treaty. tOO 
The Bank, in essence, is a credit cooperative, providing valuable 
leverage of the capital of its members. Article 13 of the Bank's 
Articles of Agreement provides that "the Bank shall not finance any 
undertaking in the territory of a member if that member objects to 
such financing. "lOt The borrowing countries accept assistance from 
the Bank, and allow their private enterprises to accept such assis-
:,ance, despite the political conditionality of the Bank's activities, and 
~---IIII!Wl~· th full awareness of this conditionality. Indeed, an arguable con-
flict of interest would seem to exist in making any sort of interven-
tion argument in this context. 
Article 8 of the Bank's Articles of Agreement provides, in perti-
nent part, as follows: 
In cases where a member might be implementing policies 
which are inconsistent with Article 1 of this Agreement, or 
in exceptional circumstances, the Board of Directors shall 
consider whether access by a member to Bank resources 
should be suspended or otherwise modified and may make 
recommendations accordingly to the Board of Governors. 
Any decision on these matters shall be taken by the Board 
of Governors by a majority of not less than two-thirds of 
the Governors, representing not less than three-fourths of 
the total voting power of the members.102 
The measures that the Bank may take include postponement of 
proposed operations, restrictions on operations, and suspension of 
operations. 103 The Bank, however, is wary of unduly restricting pri-
vate sector or community incentives when faced with an oppressive 
national government. Thus, the Bank's guidelines include "curtail-
ing planned public sector projects before taking action on private 
operations. Within the public sector it might curtail state infrastruc-
ture projects before local ones and endeavor to continue with its 
technical cooperation activities as long as possible."t04 
100 See Panel, Multiple Tiers of Sovereignty: The Future of International Governance, 88 AM. 
SOC'y INT'L. PROC. 52 (1995). 
101 Agreement, supra note 1, art. 13(iii). 
102Id. art. 8(3). 
103 See POLITICAL AsPECTS, supra note 72, at 5. 
104Id. 
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Concerning decisions based on political criteria that would be 
inconsistent with sound banking practice, the Bank, as a matter of 
prudence, "will need to consider its own financial position as well 
as the legitimate financial interests of relevant third parties" in any 
analysis of the issues. 105 The Bank must be careful not to place itself 
in vulnerable positions that could be exploited by the unscrupulous 
in countries with fledgling democracies. 
Although there was some disagreement in Paris in the negotia-
tions over the EBRD, those negotiations occurred very quickly and 
the result included overt political conditionality for the EBRD ..... l;~f ____ _ 
Indeed, the Bank's Articles of Agreement and its operations rna) 
lend support for the notion of an emerging human right of demo-
cratic governance. Professor Thomas Franck argues that the right 
of peoples to democratic governance is becoming a norm in public 
in ternationallaw. 107 This emerging norm has a strong basis in Euro-
pean foreign policy and in the formation and extension of the EU.108 
In fact, in documents relating to the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe,109 the European States, including those of 
Central and Eastern Europe, and also the United States and Canada, 
spell out their collective beliefs in the right of democratic entitle-
ment, including free elections, representative government and vali-
dation of the right to govern based on democratic succession to 
power. IIO The emerging norm, if it ever becomes universally recog-
nized, could significantly change traditional principles on noninter-
vention. This putative norm may, in the future, delimit arguments 
based on sovereignty and interference. 
This evolving norm may be even more developed in a regional 
sense in Europe. The signatories to the CSCE documents have 
pledged the following: 
105 [d. 
106 See supra notes 3, 47 and accompanying text. 
107 Franck, supra note 58, at 46. 
108 Professor Weber explains: 
Creating EBRD depended on an emerging partial consensus about the relationship 
between the state, democracy, and market economies, part of a historically and 
geographically specific stream of ideas about the shape and character of a future 
Europe and its relations with the rest of the world. 
Weber, supra note 3, at 2. 
109 Hereinafter referred to as "CSCE." 
llOFranck, supra note 58, at 64-67. 
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[We] will support vigorously, in accordance with the Char-
ter of the United Nations, in case of overthrow or at-
tempted overthrow of a legitimately elected government of 
a participating State by undemocratic means, legitimate 
organs of that State upholding human rights, democracy 
and the rule of law, recognizing their common commit-
ment to countering any attempt to curb these basic val-
ues. IlI 
381 
~ne public international law scholar, Judge Thomas Buergenthal, 
----.. u.lllplained the shrinking domaine reserve in Europe as follows: 
[N] 0 domestic jurisdiction or norm, in theory, is beyond the 
jurisdictional reach of the CSCE. Here the traditional do-
mestic jurisdiction doctrine, which has tended to shield the 
oppressive state practices and institutions from interna-
tional scrutiny, has for all practical purposes lost its mean-
ing. And this notwithstanding the fact that non-interven-
tion in the domestic affairs of a state is a basic CSCE 
principle. Once the rule of law, human rights and demo-
cratic pluralism are made the subject of international com-
mitments, there is little left in terms of governmental insti-
tutions that is domestic.ll2 
There are thus convincing arguments against any strong noninter-
vention principle in Europe, in connection with Bank activities which 
are the subject of the CSCE documents. 
III. EBRD POLICIES DIRECTLY RELATING TO LENDING 
Pursuant to its charter, the Bank has a private sector emphasis; it 
may commit no more than forty percent of its funds to the state 
sector. Il3 Given this focus, the Bank combines the functions of an 
investment bank with a development bank.u4 It is critical that the 
Bank provide financing to the private sector in order to avoid main-
tenance of undesirable state enterprises in the countries in ques-
III [d. at 69 (quoting CSCE, Document of the Moscow Meeting On the Conference on the 
Human dimension of the CSCE, Oct. 3, 1991, pmbl., at 2 (unofficial text of the U.S. delega-
tion), 30 I.L.M. 1670 (1991». 
112Franck, supra note 58, at 68 (quoting Thomas Buergenthal, CSCE Human Dimension: 
The Birth of a System, in 1 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE ACADEMY OF EUROPEAN LAw, No.2, 
at 3, 42-43). 
113 Agreement, supra note 1, art. 11 (3)(i). 
114Newburg, supra note 4, at 434. 
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tion. ll5 This focus directly relates to the economic reform in Central 
and Eastern Europe. It also safeguards against the potential for 
ineffectiveness in public sector financing, a type of financing that 
some view as a primary cause of the Latin American debt crisis and 
of the severe economic problems that the Latin American countries 
faced in the 1970s and 1980s.116 It is truly a difficult task for a multi-
lateral financial institution, however, to unleash entrepreneurial spirit 
in developing countries. ll7 
In its recent reorganization and under its new President, Mr. 
Jacques de Larosiere, the Bank appears to have leaned toward .. ,_--__ 
more traditional development banking model, de-emphasizing a.. 
initial aggressive investment banking image.11s The Bank's organiza! 
tion now more closely resembles that of the World Bank. The EBRD 
should be wary of emulating too closely the World Bank. The 
EBRD's charter is quite different than that of the World Bank, and, 
in addition, the World Bank has been subject to criticism for its lack 
of effectiveness in its role in the public sector. ll9 
The following sections discuss the following types of financing 
that the Bank is equipped to provide: loans to private enterprises, 
loans to the public sector, and the making of equity investments. 
Moreover, these sections examine the prohibition in the Bank's 
Articles of Agreement of policy-based loans. 
A. Private Sector Development 
Article 11 of the Bank's Articles of Agreement120 provides for the 
following types of loans: (1) loans to private enterprises "without 
115 See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Development, supra note 18, at 14 
(statement of David C. Mulford); see also Present at the Creation, supra note 56, at 82-83. 
116 See, e.g., Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Development, supra note 18, at 28, 
49,58 (statements of Dr. Edward Hudgins and Horst Schulman). 
1I7 D.R.R. Dunnett, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development: A Legal Survey, 
28 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 571, 573 (1991). 
118 See Weber, supra note 3, at 24. 
119 Hudgins, Turning the East Bloc, supra note 30; James Bovard, The World Bank and the 
Impaverishment of Nations, in PERPETUATING POVERTY, supra note 30, at 59. 
120 Agreement, supra note 1, art. 11 (I)(i). Article 11 states: 
Id. 
[Mjaking, or cofinancing together with multilateral institutions, commercial banks 
or other interested sources, loans to private sector enterprises, loans to any state-
owned enterprises operating competitively and moving to participation in the mar-
ket-<>riented economy, and loans to any state-<>wned enterprise to facilitate its tran-
sition to private ownership and control; in particular to facilitate or enhance the 
participation of private and/or foreign capital in such enterprises. 
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restriction";121 (2) loans to state enterprises "operating competitively 
and moving to participation in the market-oriented economy";122 
and (3) loans to state enterprises "requiring funds to facilitate their 
transition to private ownership and control. "123 This article explicitly 
provides that a state enterprise is not operating competitively unless 
it is both operating autonomously in a competitive market environ-
ment and is subject to bankruptcy laws.124 
The Bank applies the following policies in its financing activities: 
1) The Bank's general minimum lending requirement is 5 million 
~. ropean Currency Units (ECUs).125 2) The Bank provides project-based lending, often to joint ven-
tures. Credit risk may be on the Bank's balance sheet or the Bank 
may do a partial syndication.126 
3) A loan typically is secured by a borrower's assets. The Bank also 
may secure a loan on assignment of the hard and local currency 
earnings of an enterprise, on a pledge of shares, on the assignment 
of insurance proceeds, and on other contract proceeds.127 
4) The Bank lends in hard currencies, usually the Deutschmark, 
the U.S. dollar or the ECU, and requires that the borrower repay 
the loans in the currency in which the funds were originally pro-
vided.128 This is a standard commercial bank approach, although it 
is on the conservative side-the Bank could allow the borrower to 
repay in any hard currency. 
5) The Bank does not have the ability to make "soft" loans at 
concessionary or subsidized rates. 129 Accordingly, it typically sets its 
interest rates at a margin over a market benchmark rate, normally 
the Libor rate.130 Rates will depend on commercial risks and country 
risks, although the latter type of risk "is mitigated by the EBRD's 
status as a preferred creditor. "131 
121 Dunnett, supra note 117, at 582. 
122Agreement, supra note 1, art. l1(l)(i). 
123 fd. 
124 fd. art. 11 (l )(iii). 
125 FINANCING WITH THE EBRD, supra note 2, at 4. 
126 fd. 
127 fd. at 6. 
128 fd. at 4-5. 
129 See infra notes 160-61 and accompanying text. 
130 FINANCING WITH THE EBRD, supra note 2, at 5. 
131 EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, EXTERNAL FINANCING 2 
(1994) [hereinafter EXTERNAL FINANCING]. 
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6) Loan maturities generally range from between five and ten 
years, and repayment of principal normally will be in equal, semi-
annual installments.132 
7) The Bank charges the borrower various fees and expenses, for 
such services as administration of the loan, technical consultants 
and outside counsel. 133 This procedure is in accordance with com-
mercial practice. 
8) The Bank may engage in limited recourse financing. It gener-
ally does not seek guarantees from governments for private sector 
loans or from foreign parties involved in the project once a proj,..., 
is operational because cash flow from the project will provide a fOJ~ 
of security. The Bank may seek performance and completion gu 
antees from project sponsors.134 
9) When appropriate, the Bank will encourage co-financing 
The Bank will employ four types of co-financing: a) joint financir 
where loans from the EBRD and the co-financiers are used to finar 
the same set of goods or services for a project; b) parallel financil , 
where the loans finance different sets of goods and services for tile 
same project; c) syndication, in which other financial institutions 
"commit to lend under the Bank's documentation on terms reason-
ably similar to those under which the Bank is prepared to lend"; and 
d) syndicated participation, where the Bank funds an entire loan 
and after closing sells a participation to another financial institution 
or institutions.136 The last method is a funding mechanism in which 
the Bank remains committed to disburse the entire amount of the 
loan but seeks financing from other institutions.137 The Bank is 
interested in providing incentives for commercial banks and private 
investors to provide financing. The principal means by which the 
Bank currently involves commercial banks is through syndicated 
participations.138 Commercial banks in many countries recognize, 
either formally or informally, that participations should be given 
132 FINANCING WITH THE EBRD, supra note 2, at 5. 
133Id. at 6. 
134Id. 
135 For discussions of co-financing by multilateral development institutions, see generally 
James R. Silkenat, The Role of International Development Institutions in International Project 
Financing: IBRD, !FC and CoFinancing Techniques, 17 INT'L LAw. 515 (1983); Brenda S. 
Bishop, Note, The World Bank's New Co financing Initiatives: Legal Mechanisms for Promoting 
Commercial Lending to Developing Countries, 15 LAw & POL'y INT'L Bus. 911 (1983). 
136FINANCING WITH THE EBRD, supra note 2, at 7. 
137Id. 
138 See EXTERNAL FINANCING, supra note 131, at 3. 
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preferential treatment, and that participations are exempt from 
country risk provisioning requirements.139 
10) The Bank, like other multilateral financial institutions, has a 
"preferred creditor status. "140 The Bank attempts to mobilize private 
sector funds by avoiding involvement in debt reschedulings for loans 
to, and guarantees by, member countries.141 In addition, the Bank 
will not reschedule loans to private enterprises where the inability 
of the enterprise to pay the debt is based on a general foreign 
exchange shortage in the country in which the enterprise oper-
":;S.142 
11) The Bank will finance up to thirty- five percent of project cost 
for a "greenfield investment" or for long term capitalization of an 
established concern.143 A greenfield investment is one in which the 
project is entirely new, and not an improvement upon existing 
capitaI.I44 
12) The Bank encourages mixed equity and debt financing. 145 
This type of financing is often accomplished through the institution 
of the joint venture, in which the Bank requires a substantial equity 
contribution from investors.146 Typical Bank private sector projects 
are based on no more than two-thirds debt financing and at least 
one-third equity financing. 147 The Bank and other financial institu-
tions will provide the debt financing and the project sponsors will 
provide the equity financing. 148 
13) The Bank has expressed a preference for working through 
joint ventures. The "primary targets" ofEBRD financing are "private 
companies or state-owned enterprises undergoing privatization and 
the creation of new companies, including joint ventures with inter-
national strategic investors. "149 
14) The Bank has been developing nonrecourse project financing 
methods in order to minimize sovereign debt. 150 Such debt may be 
139 [d. at 4. 
140 [d. at 2; FINANCING WITH THE EBRD, supra note 2, at 5. 
141 EXTERNAL FINANCING, supra note 131, at 3; FINANCING WITH THE EBRD, supra note 
2, at 4. 
142 EXTERNAL FINANCING, supra note 131, at 4. 
143FINANCING WITH THE EBRD, supra note 2, at 8. 
144 See id. at 18. 
145 See id. at 4-5. 
146 [d. at 7-8. 
147 [d. at 8. 
148 FINANCING WITH THE EBRD, supra note 2, at 8. 
149 EXTERNAL FINANCING, supra note 131, at l. 
150Newburg, supra note 4, at 436. 
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in the form of loans or guarantees to the private sector.l5l One 
example is the Bank's use of build-operate-transfer methods of pro-
ject financing. 152 
15) The Bank has focused a great deal on how to assist small and 
medium sized enterprises.153 Loans to these type of enterprises, al-
though small, could in many cases be fast-disbursing. The Bank has 
attempted to finance such enterprises through financial intermedi-
aries and the G-7 countries.I54 
Loans, and all other types of financing provided by the Bank, are 
governed by thirteen operating principles set forth in Article 13..., 
the Bank's Articles of Agreement. The most notable of these gui~e 
lines requires the Bank to apply "sound banking principles" to 
operations155 and invest on financial terms and conditions taki 
account, inter alia, of terms and conditions normally obtained 1 
private investors for similar investments.156 The International I 
nance Corporation, which the EBRD more closely resembles tha 
the World Bank, is not required to adhere to such requirements. H 
These principles, moreover, do not seem to reconcile with the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity set forth in the same article. The Bank may not 
undertake any financing when the applicant is able to obtain suf-
ficient financing from other sources on terms and conditions that 
the Bank considers reasonable.158 
These principles present the Bank with a puzzling problem. If a 
commercial bank cannot make an investment because it would vio-
late sound banking principles, how is the EBRD to make the invest-
ment? As Steven Weber explains, ''why would a borrower accept the 
added burdens of political conditions if capital could be had from 
private lenders at the same market rates?"159 Mainly due to U.S. 
insistence, the EBRD has been denied the ability to make "soft" or 
concessionary loans. l60 Loans are made on a market basis rather 
than on a subsidized or concessionary basis, although the Bank's 
151 See id. 
152Id. 
153Id. 
154Id. at 437. 
155 Agreement, supra note I, art. 13 (i). 
156Id. art. I3(xi). 
157 See Dunnett, supra note 117, at 589 n.35. 
158 Agreement, supra note I, art. I3(vii). 
159Weber, supra note 3, at 20. 
160 U.S. Rejects Soft Loan Suggestion, 4 Europe 2000 Ltd., May I, 1992, available in WEST-
LAW, Euroee database. 
1995] EUROPEAN BANK 387 
credit rating may permit it to borrow at lower interest rates and 
charge lower interest rates. 161 
The economic situation in Central and Eastern Europe exacer-
bates the problems associated with the inconsistency in the language 
in the Articles of Agreement. In these areas, there has been a serious 
shortage of private sector capital and an inadequate banking and 
financial infrastructure. 162 The Bank's continuation will depend on 
its prosperity and on the success of reforms and other reforming 
institutions. As the economies of Central and Eastern Europe con-
tinue their transition, the Bank will more easily meet its private 
sector financing commitments. 
The Bank has provided the following explanation which appears, 
at least in part, designed to assuage concerns as to the inconsisten-
cies in its Articles of Agreement: 
The strongest comparative advantage of the Bank relative 
to other international financial institutions, aside from its 
regional focus, lies in its ability to operate both in the 
public and private sectors and to have at its disposal the 
broadest range and flexibility of financing instruments .... 
In relation to private commercial banks, the EBRD's main 
advantages lie, as a result of its shareholder base, in its 
willingness and ability to bear risk. This allows the Bank to 
act at the frontier of commercial possibilities and to be an 
effective "demonstrator." It also shares the project risk by 
acting with other private sector entities, such as commer-
cial banks and investment funds, as well as multilateral 
lenders and national export credit agencies. The EBRD 
assists companies that have difficulty in securing financing: 
as such, it complements the efforts of other lenders. 163 
This complimentary relationship may explain how the Bank will 
work within the framework of commerciality and sound banking 
principles. It presents, however, undesirable competition between 
161 [d. 
162 See Weber, supra note 3, at 12; see also Wilhelm Hankel, The Role of Finance in the Market 
Economy: Lessons for Economic Growth and Development, 1994 SAIS REv. 47 (1994) (explaining 
need for banking system in developing economies); Lachica, supra note 17, at B7; Anthony 
Robinson & Nicholas Denton, Clean-up Prior to Going on Sale: The Urgent Need for Reform of 
Central Europe's Banking System, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 15, 1993, at 25; Sesit, supra note 
17, at A9; Gillian Tett, Reform of E Europe Banks ''A Priority," FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 3, 
1993, at 4. 
163FINANCING WITH THE EBRD, supra note 2, at 3. 
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the Bank and private sector financing mechanisms. The question 
then is whether it is economically efficient for an institution, funded 
by member governments, to compete with the private sector. The 
Bank's efforts could result in a misallocation of resources. The Bank 
is an international organization established by treaty. It enjoys privi-
leges and immunities that no commercial bank could ever enjoy.164 
The ultimate issue in any of these arguments is whether private 
capital markets are adequate in the countries in question. Any eco-
nomic analysis depends on an affirmative answer to this question. 
The "natural" markets theories of, among others, the Cato Institute 
scholars seem to be misguided.165 One must be careful not to beg 
the question in an analysis of capital markets in the countries in 
transition. It may be the practical and desirable end of the analysis 
that the Bank provides needed scarce capital in these countries. 
Commercial type lending to private enterprises could minimize 
the opportunities for default to be considered as a political weapon 
against a country. Such use of default, however, is suspect and of 
questionable effectiveness. 166 This minimization of politics is in con-
flict with the Bank's political mandate. How can the Bank apply 
political conditionality when its loans are required to be primarily 
commercial in nature? The Bank's Articles of Agreement effectively 
limit the Bank to applying political criteria on a program or coun-
try-wide scale, rather than during the negotiation and performance 
of loan obligations. Indeed, the Bank's reorganization has led to a 
de-emphasis of political issues. 167 
164 See EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, REpORT TO THE U.S. SEC 
IN RESPECT OF THE ISSUE OF THE BANKS A$ 50,000,000 9% BONDS DUE 2002 (Dec. 8, 1992) 
[hereinafter SEC REpORT] (containing standard language accompanying the EBRD's filings 
made with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission concerning the EBRD's privileges 
and immunities). The significance of this point has been expressed by Peter Fox, Adjunct 
Professor at the Georgetown University Law Center and Partner in the law firm of Mallesons 
Stephen Jaques. 
165 See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text. 
166 See Kathleen M. H. Wallman, The Politics of Default: Politically Motivated Sovereign Debt 
Default and Repudiation, 20 TEx. INT'L LJ. 475, 477 (1985) (concluding that "when default 
is used as a foreign policy tool, the remedies it affords may be empty ones," and that 
"exercising default as a political weapon, when possible, is ill-advised: it is not in the interest 
of the lenders, the lenders' depositors and investors, the borrower, or the international 
financial system."). 
167 See Janet Guyon, European Bank Gets Down to Business: Under de Larosiere, Lender to East 
Eschews Politics, WALL ST. j., Mar. 14, 1994, at A8. 
\ 
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B. Public Sector Lending 
1. Infrastructure Development 
The compromise struck in the negotiation of the Bank's Articles 
of Agreement is that the Bank may commit no more than forty 
percent of its financing to the public sectors of the borrowing 
countries, and that this financing is limited to the purpose of devel-
oping infrastructure needed for market-oriented economies.168 Arti-
de 11 (l) (v) provides that the Bank shall carry out its functions, inter 
alia, "by making or participating in loans . . . for the reconstruc-
tion or development of infrastructure, including environmental pro-
grammes, necessary for private sector development and the transi-
tion to a market oriented economy. "169 The Articles of Agreement, 
however, allow the Bank to count financing provided to state enter-
prises in transition to privatization as financing to the private sec-
tor. 170 The EBRD combines the functions of the World Bank and the 
International Finance Corporation into one institution. l7l 
Ibrahim Shihata, the General Counsel of the World Bank, ex-
plains the EBRD's focus as follows: 
Direct loans to member countries for investment projects, 
which has been the main business of other [multilateral 
development banks], are less emphasized in the EBRD 
Agreement, and are listed as the last method of operation, 
confined to infrastructure, including environment programs, 
lumped together with technical assistance and conditional 
on being necessary for private sector development and the 
transition to a market-oriented economy.172 
Infrastructure development, however, is of vital importance to the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 173 The Bank's development 
banking functions may be more important than initially thought by 
168 See Easton & Rorer, supra note 3, at 534-35. 
169Agreement, supra note 1, art. ll(l)(v}. 
17oId. art. 1l(3} (iii}(b). 
171 Matthew H. Hurlock, New Approaches to Economic Development: The World Bank, the 
EBRD, and the Negative Pledge Clause, 35 HARV. INT'L LJ. 345, 371 (1994). 
172 SHIHATA, A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 50, at 61-62 (emphasis in original). 
173The term "infrastructure" refers to those functions and activities needed for a market-
oriented economy, such as adequate legal and financial systems, macroeconomic policies and 
efficient government bureaucracy. 
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the Bank's founders. As explained in the context of World Bank 
priorities: 
A recent review of World Bank group activities in support 
of the private sector has led to a focus on three priority 
areas: first, improving the business environment for the 
private sector through proper macroeconomic manage-
ment, efficient resource allocation and the creation of sup-
portive legal and regulatory framework; second, restructur-
ing or privatizing public enterprises to ensure the efficient 
provision of infrastructure and services; and third, develop-
ing financial systems which provide the incentives and in-
stitutions required to mobilize and allocate financial re-
sources efficien dy. 174 
At first, the Bank viewed the problems in Central and Eastern 
Europe as "market failure" problems.175 Eventually, the Bank con-
cluded that the lack of capital and foreign investment in the region 
was due in significant part to the lack of the infrastructure typical 
of market economies.176 The economic problems in these countries, 
particularly in the former republics of the Soviet Union, stem in part 
from "almost no economic infrastructure or preexisting practices 
from which development can proceed."177 The building of market 
174 IBRAHIM F.1. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD: SELECTED ESSAYS 30 
(1991). 
175 Weber, supra note 3, at 25-26. 
176 See id. 
177 Michael P. Malloy, Shifting Paradigms: Institutional IWles in a Changing World, 62 FORD-
HAM L. REv. 1911, 1925 (1994). As explained by one economist: 
Now let us focus on the discussion of whether this bank should lend to the public 
or the private sector. I think that the whole discussion is very confused. You cannot 
be lending anything to private entities in the foreseeable future. There won't be any 
entities that are worth lending to-it will take quite awhile before these are created. 
Moreover, what is the point of lending to private entities? For that we have commer-
cial banks. What this institution ought to do is one thing-lend to create market 
infrastructure. But you cannot find a private partner for it-you need a committed 
government-and if you trust a government that is turning something into a market 
economy you will have to lend to the government. I would like to see them, for 
example, lending to create a stock market. Now, who am I going to lend to, a bunch 
of guys who say, 'We are creating a stock market"? [sic] I would probably have to 
have the Ministry of Finance and the National Bank in it-in other words, the state 
agencies. So it is the purpose of the project that is critical, not to whom you lend; 
because if you then see that they are misusing the money or not doing what they are 
supposed to be doing, you pull the money out. I do not see what the problem is. 
Formulas on this are ridiculous. 
Present at the Creation, supra note 56, at 86. 
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infrastructure should help to resolve the previously discussed prob-
lem for the Bank, caused by the lack of sound commercial projects, 
by helping to create a firm footing for application of sound banking 
principles by the Bank. 
The Bank's recent focus on development of market infrastructure 
has a European character. The EBRD can focus on linkage of its 
infrastructure projects on both economic integration in Europe and 
on the purely domestic needs of its borrowing countries. 178 The 
EBRD has an important role in post Cold War Europe, based in part 
Ol~. its assistance in the integration process and ultimately in foster-
ing long term stability in the region.179 
2. The EBRD's Negative Pledge Policy 
One typical and very significant provision in the loan agreements 
of development banks is a negative pledge clause. lso A negative 
pledge clause provides, in essence, that although loans to the public 
sector will be unsecured, the borrower cannot provide any sub-
sequent lender better security without allowing the Bank to "share 
equally and rateably" in the security. lSI This clause could significantly 
178 See Weber, supra note 3, at 27. 
179 [d. 
180 See Hurlock, supra note 171, at 346. 
181 See id. The EBRD's standard negative pledge clause is as follows: 
(a) If the Borrower or the Guarantor is a member, the member undertakes to ensure 
that no other external debt of the member shall have priority over the Loan in the 
allocation, realisation or distribution of foreign exchange held under the control or 
for the benefit of the member. If any lien shall be created on any public assets as 
security for any external debt which will or might result in a priority for the benefit 
of the creditor of such external debt in the allocation, realisation or distribution of 
foreign exchange, such lien shall, unless the Bank shall otherwise agree, ipso facto, 
and at no cost to the Bank, equally and rateably secure the principal of, and interest 
and other charges on, the Loan, and the member, in creating or permitting the 
creation of such lien, shall make express provision to that effect; provided, however, 
that if for any constitutional or other legal reason such provision cannot be made 
with respect to any lien created on assets of any of its political or administrative 
subdivisions, the member shall promptly and at no cost to the Bank secure the 
principal of, and interest and other charges on, the Loan by an equivalent lien on 
other public assets satisfactory to the Bank. 
(b) If the Borrower is not a member, the Borrower undertakes that, except as the 
Bank shall otherwise agree: 
(i) if the Borrower creates any lien on any of its assets as security for any debt, such 
lien will equally and rateably secure the payment of the principal amount of, and 
interest and other charges on, the Loan, and in the creation of any such lien express 
provision will be made to that effect, at no cost to the Bank; and 
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CONCLUSION 
Although the EBRD is a remarkable institution, it is too early to 
determine the potential impact of the EBRD in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Its private sector mandate and its fostering of multiparty 
democracy may have an effect far beyond the specific projects that 
it undertakes. The Bank, with its approach to development that 
requires political as well as economic freedom, may present the 
world with a positive model for sustainable development. . 
